The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s Inflation Target: A Phillips Curve Analysis by Gallagher \u2704, Robbie
The Park Place Economist
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 14
2004
The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s Inflation
Target: A Phillips Curve Analysis
Robbie Gallagher '04
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Gallagher '04, Robbie (2004) "The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s Inflation Target: A
Phillips Curve Analysis," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 12
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol12/iss1/14
The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s Inflation Target: A Phillips Curve
Analysis
Abstract
This study attempts to analyze Canada’s inflation target with a specific focus on determining the
unemployment cost of their inflation target. It is hypothesized that Canada’s move towards decreased inflation
results in an unemployment cost that potentially outstrips the benefits associated with price stability.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol12/iss1/14
The Park Place Economist, Volume XII 48
Robbie Gallagher
The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s
Inflation Target: A Phillips Curve
Analysis
I.  INTRODUCTION
In February of 1988, Canada announcedits radical new approach to monetarypolicy - the push towards zero inflation.
Three years later, it became just the second nation
worldwide to institute a formalized inflation-targeting
regime (Meyer, 2000).  Since New Zealand (1990)
and Canada (1991) implemented inflation targets, the
global landscape has transformed into a collage of
nations instituting similar inflation targeting regimes.
From Spain to Finland
and from the United King-
dom to Australia, each
nation seeks to curb what
many dub the “demon” of
macroeconomic policy.
In 1988, John
Crow, the Governor of
the Bank of Canada,
sought to tame inflation in
Canada.  His goal was
simple: push towards absolute price stability now and
reap the long-run rewards of economic growth and
welfare gains later (Johnson, 1997).  Crow offered a
three-stage argument in support of targeting goals for
Canadian monetary policy.  He contends that a push
towards zero inflation will: equalize expected and ac-
tual inflation, thus improving economic performance,
stabilize economic costs due to ‘fragile’ expectations,
and smooth ‘fragile’ inflation expectations (Johnson,
1997).  This study will focus on Crow’s first asser-
tion; that inflation targeting equalizes expected and
actual inflation measures, thus improving economic
performance.  More specifically, this paper aims to
explore the effects of inflation targeting in Canada
on unemployment by testing the validity of the ex-
pectations-augmented Phillips curve.
Keynesian macroeconomic theory asserts
that decreased inflation results in increased unem-
ployment in the short-run.  On the contrary, adap-
tive expectations and rational expectations theorists
contend that a stringent commitment to decreased
inflation curbs expectations thus negating the poten-
tial increase in unem-
ployment (Abel,
2001).  Hence, the
ability to build a cred-
ible inflation target
results in long-run
stability and an elimi-
nation of the Phillips
curve inflation-unem-
ployment tradeoff.
The prospect of in-
creasing unemployment looms large for inflation-tar-
geting regimes, such as Canada.  If inflation targets
cause unemployment to spiral upwards out of con-
trol, then perhaps these targets are not the means to
tame inflation.  Contrarily, if Canada can reach the
long-run without suffering tremendous unemployment
hikes, then perhaps inflation targets are the answer.
This study attempts to analyze Canada’s inflation
target with a specific focus on determining the un-
employment cost of their inflation target.  I hypoth-
esize that Canada’s move towards decreased infla-
tion results in an unemployment cost that potentially
“Since New Zealand (1990) and
Canada (1991) implemented inflation
targets, the global landscape has
transformed into a collage of nations
instituting similar inflation targeting
regimes.”
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outstrips the benefits associated with price stability.
Section II explores previous research on in-
flation targets and credibility while Section III fo-
cuses on the Phillips curve, adaptive expectations
theory, and the rational expectations theory.  Sec-
tion IV contains my formalized empirical model.
Section V describes the data, Section VI offers re-
sults, and Section VII draws conclusions and inves-
tigates potential policy implications.
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Two main bodies of literature dominate this
research study.  I first present the relevant literature
on inflation targets followed by the relevant litera-
ture on announcement credibility.
A.  Inflation Targets
Inflation targeting is a relatively new phe-
nomenon stemming back to the late 1980s.  Hence,
much of the literature available is still in its infancy
stage.  Nonetheless, a significant amount of past
work delves into inflation targets, either directly or
indirectly.  Svensson (1997) explores the optimal
inflation target among conservative central banks
while McMahon (2000)
explores the conse-
quences of inflation targets
while maintaining a specific
focus on developing coun-
tries seeking to initiate
greater fiscal and monetary
discipline.  Of particular
importance in this study, however, are the works of
Alesina and Summers (1993), Cornwall and
Cornwall (1998), and Fortin (2003).  Much of the
early literature focused on the connections between
increased central bank independence and low infla-
tion.  Hence, these early studies provide the initial
framework for determining the relationship between
inflation targets and unemployment costs.  Later
studies, such as Fortin’s, investigate, with specific
regard to Canada, the effects that an inflation target
may have.  Significantly lacking from this body of
literature, however, is an empirical analysis that fo-
cuses directly on the unemployment costs of imple-
menting an inflation target in Canada and the poten-
tial ramifications of such a policy.
  Alesina and Summers (1993) pioneered the
relevant literature researching the benefits associated
with inflation targets.  Specifically, Alesina and Sum-
mers offer insights into the correlations between cen-
tral bank independence and the rates of unemploy-
ment, inflation, and real GDP growth.  They employ
scatter plot diagrams to depict these correlations.
Essentially, Alesina and Summers show that central
bank independence is negatively related to inflation
rates within a nation.  Hence, as central bank domi-
nance moves upward, inflation rates tend to trickle
downward.  Furthermore, they demonstrate that
greater central bank independence, and hence lower
inflation, does not have any effect on the real vari-
ables within their model.  This includes the unem-
ployment rate along with real GDP growth.  This sug-
gests that greater central bank independence leads
to greater credibility.  Their model builds directly on
the indices used by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman
et al. (1993), who all reach a similar conclusion; that
real variable changes need not accompany disinflation.
Cornwall and Cornwall (1998), however, challenge
the notion that greater cen-
tral bank independence, and
hence lower inflation rates,
have no effect on real vari-
ables in the economy.  They
suggest that changing the
nature of a central bank, in
and of itself, does not lower
inflation without cost.  Furthermore, they contend that
unemployment rates deviate in response to differences
between actual and expected inflation rates.
Cornwall and Cornwall (1998) model the
costs and benefits associated with central bank inde-
pendence.  To accomplish this, they employ an ex-
pectations-augmented Phillips curve to illustrate how
greater central bank independence costs an economy
in terms of unemployment.  Ultimately, Cornwall and
Cornwall conclude that a shift towards greater cen-
tral bank independence, contrary to previous find-
ings, results in greater unemployment.  Thus, Cornwall
and Cornwall indirectly find support for the notion
“. . .as central bank dominance
moves upward, inflation rates
tend to trickle downward.”
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that inflation targets (movements towards disinflation)
result in costs, namely in terms of unemployment.
Pierre Fortin (2003) takes the notion of cen-
tral bank independence and extends it to Canada.
Fortin argues using descriptive data that Canada’s
implementation of an inflation target is detrimental to
the economy.  Specifically, he asserts that the largely
independent Bank of Canada instituted an inflation
target without regard for the economic costs.  Cen-
tral bank independence reduces the policy adjustment
time of an economy largely due to the ability of the
bank to work as its own separate entity.  Greater
integration of banks and governments indicates a
slower transition period, as coordination often be-
comes an issue.  By laying out the Phillips curve frame-
work, Fortin describes theoretically how inflation tar-
gets are likely to cause unemployment rates to swell
inordinately high.  However, this analysis is deficient
in the respect that he ignores any empirical tests to
measure the real magnitude of costs associated with
inflation targets.
B.  Credibility Issues
Numerous studies explore the effect of cred-
ibility on inflation target announcements, and hence
the prospects for a long-run vertical Phillips curve
relationship.  Eliasson (2001) targets Australia, Swe-
den, and the United States in an attempt to determine
whether it is appropriate to assume linearity in the
short-run Phillips curve.  Johnson (1990), on the other
hand, analyzes the potential effects of inflation targets
in Canada with a focus on the importance of attaining
credibility.  Similarly, Dodge (2002) focuses on the
Canadian experience, but instead takes a backward
looking approach to analyze the actual effects that
establishing a credible anchor for inflation targets had
in Canada.   However, of particular importance to
this study are the works of Koustas (1998) and
Johnson (1997).
Koustas (1998) builds on the empirical model
set forth by King and Watson (1992) to test the va-
lidity of three long-run propositions with specific re-
gard to Canada.  Theoretically, Koustas draws on
the rational expectations theory developed by Lucas.
In his study, Koustas explores the reasoning that per-
manent changes in nominal variables have no long-
run effect on real variables.  Specifically, he tests for
long-run money neutrality, the vertical long-run
Phillips curve, and the long-run Fisher relationship.
His second empirical test is most relevant for this
study.  Drawing on data from Canada, Koustas con-
structs a bivariate vector to estimate his regression.
He initially hypothesizes that the vertical long-run
Phillips curve does not exist in Canada.  His study
finds support for this notion.  Koustas’ study pro-
vides a great deal of insight into the proposition that
Canada has not yet reached the long-run where the
Phillips relation disappears.  However, the model
seems somewhat deficient, as it does not concretely
attack the expectations-augmented Phillips curve re-
lationship.  He uses a set of bivariate regressions to
reach his conclusions.  Theory suggests that the long-
run Phillips curve is vertical resulting from expected
inflation falling into line with actual inflation.
Johnson (1997), on the other hand, con-
centrates on the specific nature of three policy an-
nouncements in Canada to signal the implementa-
tion of inflation targets.  He reasons that only cred-
ible policy announcements have any effect on ex-
pected inflation and hence the prospects for a long-
run vertical Phillips curve.  Thus, Johnson hypoth-
esizes that credible announcements on inflation tar-
gets will put downward pressure on expected infla-
tion.  If the announcements follow other credible
announcements, Johnson suggests that this magni-
fies the usefulness of the policy announcements,
possibly to the point where expected inflation actu-
ally falls in line with actual inflation levels.  To test
this hypothesis, Johnson sets up a model where ex-
pected inflation serves as his dependent variable.
He then includes inflation lagged, a recent forecast
difference variable, a variable to capture the differ-
ence between U.S. and Canadian interest rates, the
nominal bank rate over the past year, and a dummy
variable to represent specific policy announcements.
Johnson uses this last variable, the dummy variable,
to estimate the effect that certain policy announce-
ments had on expected inflation in Canada.  His
study provides support for the notion that the an-
nouncements in Canada decreased expected infla-
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tion.  This study will take Johnson’s analysis one-
step further.  Johnson models expected inflation to
flush out the relationship between announcements
and expected inflation.  This study uses a similar
method to determine expected inflation, but places
the Canadian experience into an expectations-aug-
mented Phillips curve relationship in order to get at
the unemployment effects of Canada’s inflation tar-
get.  Furthermore, this study looks solely at the ini-
tial policy announcement in Canada.  I do this in
order to determine the potential effect that Canada’s
initial policy announcement, a zero inflation target
(i.e. absolute price stability), had on expectations.
III.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned previously, this study will fo-
cus on John Crow’s assertion that inflation targets
equalize expected and actual inflation thus improv-
ing economic conditions (Johnson, 1997).  Adap-
tive expectations and rational expectations aid in ex-
plaining the change in expected inflation over time
and hence the proposition of the long-run expecta-
tions-augmented Phillips curve.  However, the
Phillips curve relationship, which I present first, gets
at the short-run effects of the difference between
expected inflation and actual inflation on unemploy-
ment.
A.  Phillips Curve
Developed in 1958 by A.W. Phillips, the
Phillips curve originally proposed an inverse rela-
tionship between the rate of wage inflation and the
rate of unemployment in the United Kingdom be-
tween 1861 and 1957, as shown by Figure 1
(Hoover 2002).  Two years later, in 1960, Paul
Samuelson and Robert Solow replicated Phillips’
study using data spanning 1900 to 1960 in the United
States (Blanchard, 2003).  With the exception of
the turbulent depression era, Samuelson and Solow’s
results supported Phillips’ in that a negative relation
exists between unemployment and inflation.  By the
1970s, however, this relationship seemingly broke
apart thus leading to the development of the expec-
tations-augmented curve, which accounts for ex-
pected inflation.  Hence, the Phillips curve relation-
ship posits that inflation depends on expected infla-
tion, cyclical unemployment, and supply shocks, as
depicted below (Abel, 2001):
π = πe – α(υ − υn) + ε
where ð equals inflation, πe equals expected inflation,
υ − υn  equals cyclical unemployment, and å equals the
error term, or more specifically, supply shocks that
disrupt cycle behavior.
Based on the theories of adaptive expecta-
tions and rational expectations, which I present next,
people form their expectations based on the recently
observed past and, on average, are correct in their
expectations.  Expected inflation, in the Phillips curve
relationship, assumes past levels of actual inflation
determine present expected inflation.  Hence, ex-
pected inflation in this model is a backward looking
variable, which depends on the assumption of adap-
tive expectations.  By similar reasoning, expected in-
flation, which depends on the credibility of announce-
ments, is a forward-looking variable.  Hence, ex-
pected inflation, for any given year, depends on both
backward and forward-looking variables in conjunc-
tion with supply shocks, which serve to disrupt nor-
mal cycle behavior.  The next part of the Phillips rela-
tion captures cyclical unemployment, or alternatively,
the deviation of actual unemployment from the natu-
ral level of unemployment.  The á represents a posi-
tive number that measures the strength of the rela-
tionship between unanticipated inflation and cyclical
unemployment.  Hence, as actual unemployment
moves further from the natural level of unemploy-
ment, inflation trends downward.  As unemployment,
or the deviation of actual from the natural rate, in-
creases, inflation decreases.  Similarly, as inflation
hikes upward, unemployment levels shrink.
B.  Adaptive Expectations
The adaptive expectations theory stems from
the notion that individuals develop forecasts of future
inflation based on past actual levels of inflation rates,
adjusted for their own past expectations.  Essentially,
adaptive expectations indicate that people base their
expectations in the future based on what occurred in
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the past.  For example, this “backward looking” theory
suggests that if inflation was high in the past, people
would tend to believe it will be high in the future (Ruby,
2003).
Adaptive expectations gained popularity in the
1980s, as a means to explain a significant amount of
the crises that pervaded much of the world after the
oil shocks of the 1970s (Adaptive, 2002).  Following
the oil shocks in the 1970s, many nations experienced
sustained high levels of inflation.  For some nations,
this sustained inflation extended well into the 1990s.
Adaptive expectations sought to explain these sus-
tained levels of inflation solely on the basis of the past.
The oil shocks in the 1970s caused inflation to spike
upwards.  The continued effect of these shocks cre-
ated a situation where inflation levels remained high
for some number of years.  With continued high levels
of inflation year after year, individuals within those
nations began to expect high levels of inflation in the
future.  Adaptive expectations theorists contend that
the best indication of the future is the past.  Individu-
als in the 1970s, recognizing that past inflation levels
were inordinately high, came to expect that future levels
would be just as high (Adaptive, 2002).  Hence, indi-
viduals adapt their expectations over time due to past
indications about the economy (Abel, 2001).
As mentioned, adaptive expectations is par-
ticularly useful to explain one portion of expected in-
flation within the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve.  Based on adaptive expectations, expected
inflation, or πe, is a function of previous levels of infla-
tion.  Hence, πe is appropriately written as πet-1 and
πe t-2.  Generally, adaptive expectations account for
two periods, assuming that what the first lag fails to
pick up, the second lag does.  On occassion, ex-
pected inflation includes a third lag, most likely a lag
of one year, in order to pick up what the other two
lags fail to pick up.  While actual inflation last year is
the most accurate indicator for actual inflation this year,
the inflation level from two years ago has some effect,
though this effect diminishes the further back in time
you go.  Hence, an extremely low inflation level two
years ago will serve to curb expectations for the fu-
ture to some degree given that last year’s actual infla-
tion level was significantly inflated.
C.  Rational Expectations
Throughout the 1960s, several economists
suggested that humans were able to adapt to their
environment, and hence to economic conditions over
time.  Robert Lucas formalized this notion in 1972
(Ruby, 2003).  Rational expectations, as Lucas
coined it, essentially assumes that the beliefs of
workers and firms are correct, on average.  Devel-
oped as a response to apparent flaws in adaptive
expectations theory, rational expectations seeks to
explain how individuals, given constantly rising in-
flation, could come to rationally infer governmental
policy (Rational, 2003).  Essentially, “rational ex-
pectations” means that the expected price is chosen
in such a way that, given shocks within the economy,
sometimes the observed price is higher than the ex-
pected price and sometimes it is lower than the ex-
pected price.  However, on average, people are cor-
rect in their expectations.  Deviations from actual
levels are possible, but as soon as this occurs,
people’s expectations change to fall back in line.
This suggests that beliefs depend on the course pur-
sued by policy makers over time.  In other words,
the rational expectations theory predicts that people
are forward-looking.  According to the rational ex-
pectations theory, as soon as a government changes
policy openly, people will change their expectations
to offset any economic distortions, assuming, how-
ever, that the open policy announcements are cred-
ible.  As Figure 1 demonstrates, rational expecta-
tions predict a shift from point A to point C under
credible, open policy announcement scenarios.  This
represents the long-run Phillips curve, labeled line
Y*.  Essentially, the shift from point A to point C
indicates that the aggregate supply at Y* is vertical,
as it immediately shifts from point A to point C and
theoretically skips point B.  If people do not have
rational expectations, then with a shift in aggregate
demand to AD
2
 equilibrium halts at point B in Fig-
ure 1, at least for some amount of time.  If rational
expectations do not exist, then the economy may
rest at point B for some significant amount of time.
Eventually, as time progressed, the economy would
move from point B to point C, the new equilibrium.
Robbie Gallagher
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FIGURE 1
Rational Expectations
Thus, according to rational expectations, if
the government seeks to implement policy changes in
order to affect the overall workings of the economy,
the only way to accomplish this is through unantici-
pated alterations.  Essentially, this indicates that a sur-
prise policy is necessary to hurdle consumer expec-
tations.  However, according to the rational expecta-
tions theory put forth by Lucas, the government can-
not surprise the general public.  Public forecasts, on
average, fall in line with actual policy guidelines.  This
explains how a nation, despite policy changes, can
end up at the long-run Phillips curve.
IV.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
The empirical model utilizes two regressions:
the first captures expected inflation based on both
adaptive expectations and rational expectations while
the second incorporates that measure of expected
inflation into a Phillips curve relationship.
A. Expected Inflation
Based on adaptive expectations and rational
expectations, expected inflation takes the following
form:
πe = β1+ β2πt-1 + β3π t-2 + β5Announce + β6US + ε
where πe equals expected inflation, πt-1 equals actual
inflation lagged one period, π t-2 equals actual inflation
lagged two periods, Announce is a dummy variable
representing the initial policy announcement, and US
represents a supply shock variable.
This equation indicates that expected infla-
tion depends on certain adaptive expectations vari-
ables and a rational expectations variable, along with
supply shocks.  Each of the actual inflation lagged
variables represents adaptive expectations variables,
as they are backward looking components.  The
announcement dummy represents a rational expec-
tation variable, as the effect of the policy announce-
ment occurs in the future and hence, people adjust
their expectations in a forward-looking manner.  The
supply shock variable attempts to account for any
abnormal disruptions in the Canadian economy due
to the United States economy.
As previously described, adaptive expec-
tations contend that expected inflation is a function
of past inflation levels.  Several methods can ad-
equately capture this.  By far, the most simplistic
way is to lag actual inflation one year.  This indicates
that expected inflation depends solely on the level
of last year’s inflation.  However, using one year as
a proxy for expected inflation is insufficient because
it completely ignores that inflation levels beyond one
year ago have an impact on expectations.  Hence,
this model uses a two-year lag, assuming that two
years is sufficient to capture the effect that past in-
flation levels have on current expectations.  What
the first lag variable fails to account for, the second
lag should pick up.  Based on theory, I hypothesize
that each of the lagged variables carries a positive
sign.
In accordance with rational expectations is
the announcement variable, which aims to capture
the effect that the initial announcement in Canada in
February of 1988 had on expected inflation levels.
Theoretically, as time goes on, the announcement
becomes more credible or it completely loses cred-
ibility.  In order to decipher between the policy ef-
fects and the sole effect of the announcement, I in-
clude a measure of supply shocks as a variable,
which I explain later.  The announcement dummy
accounts for the singular effect of that particular an-
nouncement on expected inflation over time.  If the
P1 AD2
AD1
 P2
  P3
A
B
C
YY*
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announcement carries no effect at all, this variable
will be insignificant.  Theoretically, announcing an
intended policy aim will have some effect, possibly
a large effect, on expectations.  If, as is the case in
Canada, the announcement declares an intended
target of zero inflation, then expectations, on the sole
basis of this policy announcement, may change.
Given that the policy announcement is for zero infla-
tion, I hypothesize that this variable carries a nega-
tive sign.  If the announcement carries any weight at
all, then naturally people are going to believe the
central bank and hence lower their expectations of
what inflation will be in the future.
As previously mentioned, I include a mea-
sure of supply shocks to capture the effect that ac-
tual policy changes might have on expected infla-
tion.  This variable incorporates the Canadian pro-
ducer price, along with the United States’ producer
price index for all goods.  The Canadian economy,
no doubt, depends significantly on the United States
economy to provide raw inputs, as well as other
significant economic support.  This leads to the as-
sumption that the Canadian economy moves in con-
junction with the United States’ economy.  Specifi-
cally, this variable attempts to capture supply shocks
within the Canadian economy.  In order to do this, I
subtract the Canadian producer price index from
the U.S. producer price index.  I then subtract this
figure from the Canadian exchange rate.  Essentially,
the difference between the United States’ producer
price index and Canadian producer price index in-
dicates a discrepancy between prices.  Since Ca-
nadian firms depend on the U.S. market to supply
vast amounts of raw inputs for manufacturing and
other industries, any difference between the two
values indicates a potential supply-side shock for
the Canadian economy.  Furthermore, it is essential
to compare this value with the exchange rate for
Canada in order to account for any changes in the
value of money caused by exchange rate fluctua-
tions, which could amplify or decrease any differ-
ences found between the U.S. producer price index
and the Canadian producer price index.  If the per-
centage change in the exchange rate is equal to the
difference between the percentage change in the
United States producer price index and the Cana-
dian producer price index, then there are no supply
shocks.  The inclusion of this variable is essential to
capture any supply shocks that might disrupt normal
cycle behavior.  Since Canadian firms depend on
U.S. inputs, I believe this represents a good proxy to
get at potential supply shocks within the economy
and I hypothesize that it shares a positive relationship
with expected inflation.  Table 1 presents each vari-
able, a short description of each, and their predicted
signs.
B.  Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve postulates that inflation and
unemployment share an inverse relationship repre-
sented as the following:
π – πe =  α(υ – υn) + ε
where π equals inflation, πe equals expected inflation
, υ – υn equals cyclical unemployment, and ε equals
the error term, or more specifically, supply shocks
that disrupt normal cycle behavior.  By manipulating
the above equation, I obtain regression number two.
The following depicts the transformation:
(1) π – πe =  α(υ – υn) + ε
(2) π = πe – α(υ – υn) + ε
(3)  π + α(υ – υn)  = πe + ε
(4)  α(υ – υn)  = πe – π + ε
(5)  υ – υn = 1/ α (πe – π) + ε/α
(6)  υ =1/α (πe – π) + ε/α
Equation (6) assumes that the natural rate of
unemployment is zero, in order to get at the effects
that a deviation of expected inflation from actual in-
flation has on the unemployment rate.   From equa-
tion (6), I formulate regression model 2 as follows:
υ = α1 + α2(π
e – π) + ε
where υ equals unemployment and (πe – π) equals
expected inflation obtained from Model 1 minus ac-
tual inflation, and ε represents the error term.
This regression equation incorporates a mea-
sure of the difference between expected inflation and
Robbie Gallagher
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actual inflation, as obtained in Model 1.  Assuming
that I adequately account for supply shocks in Model
1, this model predicts that the difference between
expected and actual inflation accounts for the varia-
tion in unemployment.  If expected inflation falls in
line with actual inflation, then we have the long-run
Phillips relation.  This model suggests one hypoth-
esis: The difference between expected inflation and
actual inflation carries a positive sign.  As the devia-
tion between expected inflation and actual inflation
shoots upwards, the unemployment rate increases.
Essentially, the deviation between expected values
of inflation and actual values of inflation is what drives
the Phillips curve relationship in the short-run.  The
greater the difference between the two, the greater
the unemployment costs.  Table 2 presents the vari-
ables, variable descriptions, and predicted signs.
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V.  DATA
The data used in these two models comes
from Source OECD, an Internet database that houses
economic statistics for nearly every nation around the
world dating back to 1960.  I use monthly data stem-
ming from June 1973 to December 2002.  I do this to
provide an adequate balance of data both before and
after the February 1988 zero inflation policy announce-
ment in Canada.  Source OECD provides all three
variable sets including unemployment rates, CPI val-
ues, and PPI values.  I convert the CPI values into
inflation levels, as a percentage, by calculating the in-
crease in CPI from year to year.
Throughout the post-announcement period,
the Canadian inflation rate has fluctuated quite dra-
matically.  Immediately following the announcement,
inflation tailed upwards, which goes contrary to what
theory suggests.  However, I postulate that this oc-
curred due to the uncertainty surrounding the inflation
target at the time and due in large part to the fact that
Canada did not actually institute their inflation target
until 1991.  Following 1991 and even for a short time
before 1991, inflation rates trended downwards in
Canada, which is in accord with what theory sug-
gests.  Furthermore, the unemployment rate within
Canada spanning this period shows a relatively stable
path of between 7 percent and 11 percent.  Figure 2
depicts the relationship between the inflation rate and
the unemployment rate in Canada, beginning in 1988.
As Figure 2 clearly shows, inflation rates within
Canada fluctuate quite drastically throughout the pe-
riod, ranging anywhere from just over five percent in
1989 to nearly a zero inflation rate in 1994.  Of par-
ticular importance to this study, however, are not the
absolute values of the unemployment rate or the infla-
tion rate, but rather the relationship between the two
rates.
Following the initial announcement of a zero
inflation target by Canada in February 1988, the coun-
try experienced a sharp increase in inflation that moved
from roughly three and a half percent in 1988 to just
over five percent in 1989.  However, beginning in
1991, Canada’s inflation rate began to steadily de-
cline, eventually reaching a low in 1994 at just over
zero percent inflation for the year.  Following 1994,
the inflation rate picked up somewhat and currently
hovers somewhere between one and four percent.
These inflation trends are not surprising, however.
Canada did not actually institute their inflation-tar-
geting regime until 1991, which might explain the
jump in inflation from 1988 until 1991.  Following
1991, inflation rates declined and, on the whole, are
considerably lower than in years prior to 1988.  This
suggests that the inflation target is working to curb
inflation rates within the country.  Unemployment
rates in Canada follow a different pattern than infla-
tion rates, but show an overall decline throughout
the period.  Specifically, immediately following the
announcement in 1988, unemployment rates dipped
slightly only to rise and peak at just over eleven per-
cent in 1993.  From 1993 on, unemployment rates
show a constant decline, indicating that perhaps the
credibility of Canada’s announcement is creating a
situation where expected inflation is slowly falling in
line with actual inflation.  In other words, this sug-
gests increasing credibility over time.
Comparing these trends in inflation and un-
employment, it is apparent that perhaps an unem-
ployment-inflation tradeoff does exist in Canada fol-
lowing the initial announcement in 1988.  From 1991
until 2002, inflation rates remained low, on the av-
erage, while unemployment rates remained relatively
constant, with a slight decline from year to year, which
suggests increasing credibility.  Figure 2 clearly dem-
onstrates that inflation targets quite possibly result in
unemployment costs, as indicated by the jump in
unemployment and the associated drop in inflation
beginning in 1991.  Furthermore, Figure 2 demon-
strates the possibility that the Bank of Canada is
slowly gaining credibility with their inflation target
announcements.  This suggests, as indicated by the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, that Canada
is slowly reaching the long-run stage where expected
inflation falls in line with actual inflation.  If this is
indeed the case, then the unemployment costs of
Canada’s inflation target are diminishing over time.
This is essentially John Crow’s long run utopia of
price stability and minimal unemployment costs.
Based solely on the trends in inflation and unem-
ployment over time, however, it appears as though
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the inflation target set forth by John Crow created
significant unemployment costs initially, as unemploy-
ment rates shot up from nearly seven percent to just
over eleven percent.  My empirical analysis supports
this notion.
VI.  RESULTS
Both models use ordinary least squares
(OLS).  I first present results for Model 1, the ex-
pected inflation model.  Subsequently, I present re-
sults for Model 2, which aims to test the validity of
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve with re-
spect to Canada.
A.  Expected Inflation
As mentioned, I use OLS to approximate the
empirical model.  I present the results of Model 1 in
Table 3.
Model 1 incorporates two adaptive expec-
tations variables, a rational expectations variable, and
a supply shock variable.  As a whole, Model 1 ac-
counts for 32.7% of the variation in expected infla-
tion, according to the R2 value.  Furthermore, all of
the coefficients within the model have the expected
sign and proper magnitudes.  Moreover, each of these
variables is highly significant.  In particular, πt-1, or
actual inflation lagged one period, demonstrates a
positive relationship with expected inflation, as it
should.  A one percent increase in actual inflation
lagged one year indicates a .111 percent increase in
expected inflation this year.  This figure falls within
an acceptable range, as the effect of a one percent
increase in actual inflation lagged one year should
not have more than a one percent increase effect on
actual inflation this year.  Furthermore, this effect
should be above zero.  Hence, since this coefficient
is between zero and one, it is within the acceptable
range.  Actual inflation lagged one year, πt-1, is sig-
nificant to the .05 level.  This demonstrates a highly
significant relationship.
Similar to actual inflation lagged one year,
actual inflation lagged two years, or πt-2, is highly
significant.  This particular variable is significant to
the .01 level, meaning it is slightly more significant.
The coefficient indicates that a one percent increase
in actual inflation lagged two years results in a 0.146
percentage increase in actual inflation this year.  In
accord with actual inflation lagged one year, this co-
efficient must fall between zero and one.  Hence, it
is within the acceptable range.  The worrisome as-
pect of this coefficient, however, is that it is higher
than actual inflation lagged one year, which goes
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against theory.  Theory suggests that the level of in-
flation one period ago has a larger effect than infla-
tion from two periods ago on this year’s inflation.
The results suggest that inflation from two periods
ago has the larger effect.  Though this goes against
theory, perhaps my use of monthly data provides an
adequate explanation.  Perhaps if I had used yearly
data, then this would hold true because people have
more time to adjust.  Nonetheless, this coefficient is
highly significant and falls within the acceptable range.
The announcement dummy coefficient sug-
gests that the announcement effect decreases ex-
pected inflation by 0.001782 percent.  Hence, there
is some credibility associated with Canada’s initial
zero inflation announcement.  If the announcement
lacked all credibility, then I would expect this coef-
ficient to equal zero.  Theoretically, if the announce-
ment carried no credibility then it would have no
effect on expected inflation.  This coefficient falls
within an acceptable range,
but the small coefficient
suggests that the credibil-
ity of the announcement is
minimal.  The announce-
ment dummy is significant
to the .001 level, thus indi-
cating that it is highly sig-
nificant.
The supply shock
coefficient is also highly sig-
nificant.  It is significant to
the .001 level, as well.  This
coefficient suggests that a
one percent deviation in the
difference between the
United States’ PPI and the
Canadian PPI adjusted
using the Canadian ex-
change rate results in a
0.01524 percent increase
in expected inflation.
Along with all other vari-
ables in this model, this co-
efficient carries the ex-
pected sign and falls within
an acceptable magnitude.  Supply shocks, or events
that disrupt the normal workings of the economy,
should theoretically increase expected inflation.  As-
suming that the variable used to represent supply
shocks provides an adequate proxy this coefficient
predicts what theory suggests.
B.  Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
As mentioned, I use OLS to approximate
the empirical model.  I present the results of Model 2
in Table 4.
Model 2 attempts to test the validity of the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with respect
to Canada following their initial zero inflation target.
As a whole, this model accounts for 2.1% of the
variation in unemployment, according the adjusted
R2 value.  Though this value appears excessively low,
it is nonetheless acceptable.  This model does not
attempt to control for any other variables.  A large
multitude of variables af-
fects unemployment rates.
In order to test the valid-
ity of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve,
however, I exclude these
ceteris paribus variables.
The Phillips curve frame-
work suggests that unem-
ployment and inflation
share an inverse relation-
ship.  As applied to an ex-
pectations-augmented
framework, the larger the
difference between ex-
pected inflation and actual
inflation, the larger the un-
employment cost.  There-
fore, despite the disap-
pointing adjusted R2
value, the model does
what it sets out to do.
Hence, this R2 value, tak-
ing into account that I ex-
clude all ceteris paribus
variables, is appropriate.
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Perhaps even more important than the R2 value,
however, is that the coefficient associated with the
deviation between expected inflation and actual in-
flation carries the correct sign and is highly signifi-
cant.
Model 2 predicts that a one percent increase
in the deviation between expected and actual infla-
tion results in a .836 percent increase in the unem-
ployment rate.  This falls within an acceptable range.
The farther away expectations are from actual val-
ues of inflation, the higher are the associated unem-
ployment costs, according to theory.  Hence, this
value should be small with minor deviations and large
with significant deviations.  As it stands, a 0.836
percent increase in the unemployment rate is rea-
sonable.  The coefficient is significant to the .01 level,
meaning that it is highly significant.  Though this model
has little predicting power in terms of an R2 value,
the correct signs and high significance values indi-
cate it is a good predictor.  Since the aim is to test
the validity of the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve, these results have significant meaning and suc-
cessfully predict what theory suggests.
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
This study persuasively supports the notion
that inflation targets result in unemployment costs,
which are possibly significant in magnitude.  Undoubt-
edly, moves towards disinflation, such as an inflation
target, result in higher unemployment levels.  The
Phillips curve predicts this relationship and my re-
sults also support this notion.  Perhaps the most sig-
nificant conclusion of this study, therefore, is that in-
stituting inflation targets can result in unemployment
costs.  The deviation between expected inflation and
actual inflation magnifies these costs.  If expected in-
flation is five percentage points higher than actual in-
flation as compared to only one percent higher, then
surely this indicates a more significant unemployment
cost.  This reasoning leads to the conclusion that an-
nouncement credibility is crucial to successfully imple-
menting an inflation target, as hinted at by previous
research on the topic.  A credible announcement, theo-
retically, should decrease expected inflation possibly
to the point where expected inflation falls in line with
actual inflation.  This study supports the notion that
announcements can alter expected inflation.
Hence, with specific regard to the Canadian
situation, my results suggest that they have yet to reach
the long-run, where expected inflation falls in line with
actual inflation and the unemployment costs disap-
pear.  Initially, this is what John Crow hoped for –
suffer the consequences of disinflation policy in the
short-run and reap the rewards of long-run growth
and welfare increases as expected inflation falls in
line with actual inflation due to credibility over time.
Unfortunately, for Canada, expected inflation and ac-
tual inflation have yet to equalize meaning that the
unemployment costs of their inflation target will con-
tinue to accumulate.  These findings suggest that in-
flation targets may not be the answer to taming infla-
tion due to the potentially excessive unemployment
costs.  Canada instituted their inflation target nearly
sixteen years ago and has yet to reach the long-run
utopia that John Crow dreamed of.  The unemploy-
ment costs of implementing this policy continue to
grow.  Perhaps the length of Canada’s “short-run” in
regards to this inflation target suggests that the costs
of such a policy outweigh the benefits associated with
price stability.
The conclusions set forth above suggest pos-
sible policy implications.  First, if inflation targets are
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to work without unemployment costs, then announce-
ment credibility is of utmost importance.  If a nation
seeks to implement a target and aims to avoid the
subsequent increase in unemployment, then they must
strive to build credibility before instituting such a policy.
If announcement credibility is such that expected in-
flation falls in line with actual inflation then disinflation
through an inflation target is possible without the un-
employment costs experienced by Canada.  Further-
more, another policy implication is that inflation tar-
gets may not be the best way to attack inflation.  The
results of this study support the notion that the unem-
ployment costs of inflation targets are significant and
hence nations should seek to implement policies other
than inflation targets, unless they can build credibility
such that expected inflation falls in line with actual in-
flation.  Canada’s inability to reach John Crow’s long
run utopia after nearly sixteen years provides con-
vincing evidence to support this notion.
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